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Abstract: This article constitutes a brief reply to Timothy Pawl's clear and 
insightful article on Conciliar Trinitarianism (defined as the Trinitarian 
theology of the Ecumenical Councils from Nicaea I to Nicaea II). The two 
basic arguments of that article (regarding the relationship between divine 
persons and divine nature and the debate over possible subordinationism) 
are celebrated rather than challenged. I instead offer three short comments. 
The first concerns the limited nature of the conciliar texts for the articulation 
of highly developed Trinitarian theology, and thus the question of 
methodology as it applies to Conciliar Trinitarianism. The second comment 
argues that the question of strict identity in the Godhead can be extended 
beyond the relationship of divine person and divine nature to the question of 
divine nature and divine power, will, and energy. The third comment argues 
that Pawl gives undue weight to a line from Cyril of Alexandria for a 
discussion of the Holy Spirit's mode of origination, and not enough weight to 
the clause related to the Holy Spirit articulated at the First Council of 
Constantinople, which recurs in one way or another at each of the subsequent 
Ecumenical Councils, up to and including Nicaea II. These three comments 
serve more as a supplement than a challenge to Pawl's original article, 
providing three further avenues for scholarly deliberation on the matter of 
Conciliar Trinitarianism. 
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Introduction 
 
Timothy Pawl has written an excellent article, which clearly delineates the contours 
of Conciliar Trinitarianism and offers detailed consideration of two crucial questions 
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in Trinitarian theology: 1) the relationship between divine persons and divine 
nature; and 2) the possibility of subordinationism as a consequence of the intra–
Trinitarian relations. If the issue editors or readers had hoped for or expected a 
spirited disagreement with Pawl’s findings in this response, they will sadly be 
disappointed. They might also be disappointed in the style of this response, since I 
am trained in neither analytic philosophy nor analytic theology. Be that as it may, I 
certainly agree with Pawl’s basic arguments on the matter of the relationship 
between divine persons and divine nature, viz. that on the terms of Conciliar 
Trinitarianism, the relationship cannot be one of strict identity (person = nature) in 
the manner of Sabellianism or modalism, nor can it be construed in terms of a strong 
form of instantiation (each divine person individually “instantiates” the divine 
nature) which easily leads to some version of tritheism. I also agree with Pawl’s 
position that the atemporal causal dependency of the persons of the Son and the 
Holy Spirit on the person of the Father espoused in Conciliar Trinitarianism need 
not imply a form of ontological subordinationism in the Godhead. The ontological 
aseity or independence of the divine nature common to the Father, the Son, and the 
Holy Spirit, as Pawl argues, sufficiently addresses the apparent threat of ontological 
subordination. Aseity and independence for Pawl indicate “that the thing [has] a 
nature that doesn’t depend on something else,” a condition satisfied by the aseity of 
the divine nature of the Son and the Holy Spirit.1 This definition of aseity or 
independence does not preclude “depending on the Father in other senses of the 
term,” specifically in the sense of atemporal or eternal origination (the relationship 
of cause to caused).2 These are the chief arguments of Pawl’s paper, and I agree with 
them. 
In what follows, I will merely amplify some of Pawl’s points and attempt to 
nuance others. I begin by emphasizing the limited nature of the conciliar texts for 
the purposes of mining an in–depth Trinitarian theology, and use this to raise the 
question of methodology as it relates to Conciliar Trinitarianism. I next turn to the 
identity question raised by Pawl and argue that the question can legitimately be 
extended beyond the matter of relating person to nature in the Godhead to the 
matter of relating divine nature to divine power. I then deal briefly with Pawl’s 
treatment of the Holy Spirit, which I argue gives undue weight to a line in Cyril of 
Alexandria for the extrapolation of a conciliar understanding of the Son’s 
 
1 Pawl (2020, 22). 
2 For further stimulating theological discussion of “the Father as Cause,” see Zizioulas (2006, 113–
54). Of course, if we define aseity and independence differently to mean strictly “unbegotten” as a 
personal or hypostatic property, then aseity and independence would, according to Conciliar 
Trintiarianism, belong to the Father alone. 
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involvement in the origination of the Spirit, and not enough weight to the clause 
related to the Holy Spirit articulated at the First Council of Constantinople and 
ratified verbatim at each subsequent Ecumenical Council up to and including Nicaea 
II. 
 
1. The Sources and Methodology of “Conciliar Trinitarianism” 
 
The idea of elaborating a “Conciliar Trinitarianism” based on the proceedings of the 
Ecumenical Councils from Nicaea I (325) to Nicaea II (787) is an attractive one, but 
immediately faces a challenge. The challenge is the fact that a detailed articulation 
of the doctrine of the Trinity is not the primary or direct concern of any of these 
councils. Certainly, I would argue that the doctrine of the Trinity is upheld by all of 
these councils, its outline is also creedally defined, and its deniers clearly 
anathematized. Its details, however, are largely addressed indirectly as they relate 
to the articulation of the doctrine of the person of Christ, which forms the 
fundamental impetus for the summoning of each Council (and, in the case of the 
First Council of Constantinople in 381, also the doctrine of the Holy Spirit). To help 
remedy the “shortfall” of explicit Trinitarian texts in these conciliar documents, we 
find Pawl drawing on later Western conciliar sources (the Fourth Lateran Council in 
1215) in order to build his argument more deeply.3 The argument is made that 
drawing on the Fourth Lateran Council is legitimate, even though “its documents 
do not count as part of Conciliar Trinitarianism, as defined here,” because “in it, we 
find one of the most detailed discussions of the Trinity from later councils.”4 
This raises for me an important question of methodology for the enterprise of 
Conciliar Trinitarianism. If the Councils from Nicaea I to Nicaea II serve as the basic 
parameter for the discussion, can a leap to the theology of 1215 be justified 
methodologically? Surely it would be more justifiable to draw on the detailed 
Trinitarian texts of those figures who directly contributed to one or another of the 
Councils from Nicaea I to Nicaea II (e.g. the Cappadocian Fathers, Cyril of 
Alexandria), rather than to pull in far later texts, simply by virtue of their falling 
under the rubric of “conciliar.” Perhaps it can be justified in terms of the reception 
of the earlier councils by later ones, but that argument is not made. 
I sympathize with Pawl insofar as if we attempt to limit Conciliar Trinitarianism 
to the bare text of the Councils (Nicaea I to Nicaea II), we will struggle to find 
developed answers to a number of philosophical questions related to the doctrine of 
 
3 Pawl (2020, 8). 
4 Ibid. 
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the Trinity. Pawl, having mentioned five philosophical questions that do receive 
answers, gives one such question to which he does not find a detailed answer in the 
Councils, namely, what is the relation between each person and the divine nature?5 
Clearly, Conciliar Trinitarianism defined as the Trinitarian doctrine of the Councils 
from Nicaea I to Nicaea II calls out for immediate supplementation (which perhaps 
makes Conciliar Trinitarianism itself an unduly limiting category). Rather than 
immediately leap to later conciliar documents, however, I think the first port of call 
should be either 1) the Trinitarian writings of figures linked to the Councils 
themselves or 2) the explicit reception of less developed or ambiguous Conciliar 
Trinitarian doctrine in later Christian tradition. Otherwise, the exercise defined as 
Conciliar Trinitarianism becomes something different.  
 
2. The Strict Identity Question: Person, Nature, Will, and Energy 
 
Pawl establishes with lucidity the fact that the categories of person and nature in the 
Godhead (as these are elaborated in the conciliar documents) cannot be strictly 
identified in all respects, if for no other reason than that there are three persons yet 
one nature. This is an important position, but a relatively uncontroversial one in 
post–Nicene theology. It is I think fair to say that a strict identity theory to describe 
the relationship between divine persons and divine nature is straightforwardly 
incompatible with Conciliar Trinitarianism. The question of strict identity can also 
be brought to bear, however, on another element of Conciliar Trinitarianism. When 
Pawl discusses what there is “one of” in God, the answer is given as “nature, 
substance, divinity, essence, Godhead,” although a little earlier he cites texts that 
also include power, might, majesty, glory, will, and other attributes.6 To extend the 
discussion of strict identity, we might ask: does Conciliar Trinitarianism posit a strict 
identity between the attributes of God and the nature or essence of God? Clearly, 
they all belong to what there is “one of” in God, and thus one might on this basis 
think they are strictly identical with each other. This, however, need not be the case 
and indeed, there are two good reasons why Conciliar Trinitarianism may not 
permit such a strict identity between divine nature and divine power, energy, or 
will. 
The first reason is connected with the decisions of the first Councils (Nicaea I and 
Constantinople I), in which the Son of God is identified as consubstantial with the 
Father and (in the words of the original Nicene Creed), ‘of the essence [ousia]’ of the 
 
5 Pawl (2020, 6). 
6 Pawl (2020, 3). 
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Father. In the arguments presented by Athanasius of Alexandria between these two 
Councils, a forceful distinction was posited between something being a product of 
the divine nature and something being a product of the divine will.7 According to 
this idea, the Son of God is so “by nature and not by will” in contradistinction to the 
created order, which exists by the divine will but not by the divine nature. If the 
divine nature and the divine will are thus not identical in every respect (strict 
identity theory), then it can legitimately be claimed that there is thereby introduced 
a certain distinction into what there is “one of” in God. 
The second reason that Conciliar Trinitarianism might be uneasy with a strict 
identity theory between divine nature on the one hand, and divine power, energy, 
or will on the other can be discerned in the decisions of the Third Council of 
Constantinople (680–1). There, the theology of Christ’s two wills and energies 
(divine and human) was ratified. In the process of ratifying this theology, the 
Council declares that: 
 
we recognize the energy [energeian] of each nature, that is to say, the essential, 
natural, and corresponding energy proceeding from each essence and nature 
undividedly according to its innate natural and essential quality, as well as the 
indivisible and unconfused co–operation [synergeian] of each essence that takes place 
[in the person of Christ]. For it is this that causes the difference of energies in Christ, 
just as the being of natures [causes the difference] of natures.8 
 
It must be emphasized that this Council’s assertion of Christ’s two energies and wills 
is primarily offered as a corollary of the Chalcedonian affirmation of Christ’s two 
natures. However, the language used is certainly open to the implication that there 
is a distinction in the Godhead between divine nature and divine energy, the latter 
of which “proceeds” from the former in an undivided but nonetheless distinct 
manner. This is exactly the argument that would be taken up with such vigor in late 
Byzantium during the so–called Hesychast or Palamite controversy.9 It is also an 
argument, however, resisted in Thomist theology, in which the divine nature and 
divine act or energy (and thus also the divine will) are generally construed to be 
strictly ontologically identical on the basis of a strong understanding of divine 
simplicity. There is, certainly, the added complex philosophical and theological 
 
7 See Athanasius, Against the Arians 3.59–67. 
8 Acta conciliorum oecumenicorum Series secunda, volumen secundum: Concilium universale 
Constantinopolitanum tertium (680–681). Concilii actiones I–XVIII 11.444–446. 
9 For a summary of this controversy and the theology of its main protagonist, Gregory Palamas, 
see Meyendorff (1964). For a spirited defense of the essence–energies distinction in God, see 
Bradshaw (2004). 
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question of real versus nominal or conceptual distinctions in the Godhead, although 
I think the language of the Third Council of Constantinople can only with great 
difficulty be touted as assuming a purely nominal or conceptual distinction between 
the categories of essence and energy (and essence and will). This Council’s decisions 
are partly predicated on the idea that energy and will are discrete ontological 
categories that wholly and undividedly issue or proceed from nature, but are not 
thereby merely conceptually or nominally distinct from it (and thus their explicit 
presence in Christ calls for definition). If the distinction were merely nominal, 
presumably the Chalcedonian Definition of “one person in two natures” would 
suffice without the further need to supplement this with language of two “natural 
wills” and two “natural energies.” There is a form of real distinction at play here, in 
however qualified a sense, and it is a distinction applied in the Conciliar decisions 
to the human and divine natures of Christ in equal measure. In short, Conciliar 
Trinitarianism thus offers resources that are not frequently tapped but are 
nevertheless important for ongoing discussions in Trinitarian theology East and 
West. 
 
3. The Person of the Holy Spirit in Conciliar Trinitarianism 
 
Lastly, in this brief response to Pawl’s article, I would like to discuss his treatment 
of the person of the Holy Spirit. His comments come in a section dealing with the 
relations (of origin) between the three divine persons. To speak of the Holy Spirit, 
Pawl chooses as his Conciliar source a section from Cyril of Alexandria’s Third 
Letter to Nestorius (ratified at the Council of Ephesus), a letter incidentally dealing 
not with the internal relations of origin within the Trinity, but with the oneness of 
Christ’s person and hypostasis.10 Although Pawl explicitly says that he is not making 
a case for the Filioque in the early councils (whereby the Spirit proceeds from the 
Father “and the Son”), he uses Cyril’s text, which speaks of a “pouring forth” 
(procheitai) of the Spirit from the Son, to do just that, claiming that the Conciliar texts 
espouse a theology whereby “the Spirit proceeds from the Father in a way that, in 
some manner, includes the Son.”11 However, it is hard to make the case for a causal 
relation between the Son and the Spirit on the basis of Cyril’s text. The context shows 
that the eternal origin of the Spirit from the Son is not what Cyril has in mind, but 
the pouring forth of the Spirit through the one Son of God upon the apostles. 
 
10 Pawl (2020, 3–4). 
11 Pawl (2020, 4). 
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 For a firmer foundation, Pawl need look no further than the clause of the 
Nicene–Constantinopolitan Creed that is consciously repeated verbatim in the acts 
of each Council from Constantinople I to Nicaea II (perhaps misleadingly eliminated 
by ellipses in Tanner’s edition of the third to seventh Councils): 
 
We believe in the Holy Spirit, the Lord, the Giver of Life, who proceeds from 
the Father, who with the Father and the Son together is worshipped and 
glorified, who spoke through the prophets. 
 
This is the clause that holds the weight of Conciliar Trinitarian doctrine on the Holy 
Spirit, not the line in Cyril’s letter. In fact, for the question of internal relations of 
origin, Conciliar Trinitarianism consistently speaks of the Spirit as proceeding from 
the Father. On two occasions in the documents of Nicaea II, the Spirit is said to 
“proceed from the Father through the Son” (ek tou patros di’ uiou ekporeuomenon), long 
an acceptable gloss in the Greek Christian East, but not raised to Conciliar status 
until then.12 The latter gloss attempts to safeguard and express the positive eternal 
relation between the Son and the Spirit, but it is never articulated as a causal relation 
or relation of origin (the principle of origin in the Godhead for Conciliar 
Trinitarianism is always and in all senses the Father). Regarding the text from Cyril, 
this was indeed used in debates regarding the Filioque in the later medieval period. 
Nilus Cabasilas in the fourteenth century refutes its use as a Filioque proof–text on 
the basis mentioned above, that it refers to the economy rather than to the eternal 
procession of the Spirit. He adds that Cyril is using a different verb than the usual 
one to denote the Spirit’s eternal procession (procheisthai instead of ekporeuesthai), 
and further points out that in the Conciliar documents for Ephesus I (431), at which 
Cyril played the leading role, we find the following: “[the Spirit] is consubstantial 
with them [Father and Son] and pours forth or rather proceeds from God the Father 
as from a source (pēgēs), but is bestowed on creation through the Son.”13 In other 
words, the burden of proof falls on those who say that the Spirit’s causal procession 
from the Father includes the Son “in some manner.” Articulating the Spirit’s 
procession ‘through the Son’ is acceptable in the language of Conciliar 
Trinitarianism, but this is nowhere explicitly or implicitly understood as defining a 
causal relationship between the Spirit and the Son. In fact, the only instance in which 
the Spirit’s procession ‘through the Son’ is obliquely explained in Conciliar 
Trinitarian texts, it is understood to refer to the bestowal of Spirit on creation 
 
12 Concilium universale Nicaenum secundum (787). Concilii actiones I–VII, 3.236, 10.960. 
13 Concilium universale Ephesenum anno 431. 1.1.4.60. For Nilus’ argument, see his Orations on the 
Holy Spirit 4.42. 
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“through the Son.” As mentioned in section 2 above, this state of affairs calls for 
engagement with texts beyond the Conciliar documents themselves if we are to 
clarify this and take the discussion further, but on the basis of Conciliar 
Trinitarianism strictly understood, the primacy of the Creedal clause and its various 
glosses (whereby the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father), must be upheld as the 
essential and consistent bedrock for articulating the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. 
 
Conclusion 
 
I would like to re–iterate my appreciation for Timothy Pawl’s careful article on 
Conciliar Trinitarianism, particularly for its philosophical defense of the basic 
framework of post–Nicene Trinitarian Theology (that espouses neither a strict 
identity theory to explain the relationship between divine persons and divine 
nature, nor a strong instantiation theory), as well as its rejection of the claims of 
ontological subordination that are so often levelled at Conciliar Trinitarianism. 
Rather than question or further bolster these points, I turned my attention instead to 
the question of methodology, followed by two specific matters that arose from my 
reading of the article. On methodology, I suggested that if Conciliar Trinitarianism 
is understood as “the conjunction of claims about the Trinity in the first seven 
ecumenical councils,” then these parameters should be consistently used or, if not, 
good reasons should be given for venturing beyond these parameters. I suggested 
that two ways of legitimately extending these parameters would be to deal either 
with texts by figures directly involved in the Councils, or with texts that explicitly 
engage with and debate the Conciliar documents themselves. The two specific issues 
from Pawl’s article that I addressed beyond the question of methodology were the 
question of strict identity, and his treatment of the Holy Spirit. On the first matter, I 
argued that a further interesting line of inquiry involves not simply the question of 
the relationship between the divine persons and divine nature, but also the question 
of the relationship between divine nature or essence and divine power, will, and 
energy. This becomes a legitimate line of inquiry when we consider the relatively 
strong distinction between divine nature and divine will in Athanasius of 
Alexandria’s theology, as well as the preoccupation with the doctrine of Christ’s two 
energies and wills at the Third Council of Constantinople, even if the matter is not 
definitively decided in the Conciliar documents. On the second matter, I argued for 
the primacy of the Creedal clause when discussing the Conciliar position on the 
Holy Spirit, specifically the question of the Spirit’s relation of origin, rather than a 
debated line from Cyril’s Christologically–oriented Third Letter to Nestorius. In 
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sum, this brief foray into the realm of Conciliar Trinitarianism has, I hope, provided 
a modest supplement to Timothy Pawl’s excellent article. 
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